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The price of gasoline is not subject to state regulation: so says a
Federal district court of three judges sitting in Tennessee.1 The
man with the red, blue or orange "sentry" on whom so much of
present day progress depends and the oil company behind him are
not engaged in a "public calling." The question of what is a "public
calling" or a business "affected with a public interest"2 might be
superficially dealt with by listing those businesses which have already
been declared such. It might also be resolved by the assertion that
monopoly is the test: that a business which enjoys a monopoly either
legal (as by exclusive franchise) or natural (as by geographic loca-
tion) is a public business and thereby rendered subject to govern-
mental rate regulation.
This is the rule of many cases. But it will not do as a justifica-
tion of others equally authoritative. These latter are the ones worthy
of study-the simple cases take care of tbemselves.
Of course a business does not have to :be "affected with a public
interest" in order to be subject to some regulation; any occupation
may fall under governmental control as to matters of public health,
safety, etc.3 It is when prices are involved that the question before
us is raised.
1Standard Oil Co. of La. v. Hall, Corer., 24 F. (2d) 455 (M. D. Tenn.,
1927).
'The classic phrase from Lord Hale, quoted in Muinn v. Illinois, 94 U. S.
113, 126 (1876).
Regulations concerning the labelling of gasoline containers (C. S. 4869)
are of this class. Obviously such a statute is evidence of a "public interest"
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The policy of the law is to have the necessities of life (and things
which, while not necessities, 'have come to be regarded as part of the
American standard of living) 4 available to everyone at reasonable
prices, that is, prices which yield only a fair commercial profit to the
seller. As to most things, prices are supposed to be kept within
bounds 'by the beneficient influences of competition. If they are so
controlled in fact, there is no need for governmental regulation. If
they are not, then some type of governmental interference looms up
as the solution. It is evident that in cases of franchise or natural
monopoly,5 competitive influences are lacking or restricted. There-
fore these are the simplest cases for state rate regulation, the ones
concerning which there is no dispute and the ones which furnished
the monopoly test, inadequate, but most often advanced. 6 There is a
third kind of monopoly which also prevents the natural drift of prices
to reasonable levels; it is artifical combination of otherwise competi-
tive groups. The law has dealt with this condition too,-not -by regu-
lating the rates of the combination, (since its exorbitant charges are
not considered inherent in the business itself) but by criminal prose-
cution and dissolution proceedings to, restore the natural state of
affairs, i.e. by anti-trust laws.7
Finally there are some fields of human enterprise wherein for
some reason not always clear or easy to classify one party deals at a
in the conduct of the business and discredits the classification based on a tech-
nical use of the phrase in rate regulation cases. The latter involve only a
special kind of public interest.
'As to things which are luxuries pure and simple there is at present no
such policy (see, however, note 7, post) and that seems in large measure the
basis of the decision in Tyson v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 47 Sup. Ct. 426 (1927)
holding unconstitutional by a divided court a statute fixing the maximum resale
price for theater tickets. Approved in 13 Va. L. Rev. 554; strongly disap-
proved in 25 Mich. L. Rev. 880. It has been urged that the charges of middle-
men might be subject to regulation even when the original producers' price
might not. Dissent of Mr. Justice Stone in Tyson Case; 75 U. Pa. L. Rev. 778.
'Franchise monopolies: Railroads, Telephone and Telegraph Companies,
Gas and Electric Companies, the enterprises commonly called public utilities.
Natural monopolies: Grain warehouses situated in a strategic position, Munn v.
Illinois. supra, note 2. Regulation was subsequently sustained as to ware-
houses not so monopolistically situated, Brass v. North Dakota, 153 U. S. 391,
14 Sup. Ct. 857 (1894) and consequently the monopoly test was later said(McKenna, J., in German Alliance Ins. Case, note 8, post) to have been
abandoned. R~ailroads classified above as franchise monopolies have also cer-
tain elements of natural monopolies since the amount of capital required to
build one and its immobility when invested deter ready competition.
'See Wyman, 17 Harv. L. Rev. 156, 166.
'Standard Oil and Tobacco Cases, 221 U. S. I and 110, 31 Sup. Ct. 502 and
632 (1911). Combinations may be unlawful even though they do not relate to
necessities or even articles of much public importance.
NOTES
disadvantage with the other; wherein the evils of monopoly seem to
be present though monopoly itself cannot be found; wherein for ex-
ample, well informed sellers offer standardized contracts to poorly
informed buyers and terms are largely the will of one side.
Out of such conditions came the fire insurance rate regulation
statute of Kansas, and because of such conditions it was sustained
in the United States Supreme Court.8 Out of such conditions might
also come regulation of rates in some vast industries against which
the government has tried so far only the expedients of anti-trust
prosecution under the possibly mistaken view either (1) that the
advantage possessed by such concerns over the public was due en-
tirely to unlawful and preventable "artificial" combination rather
than to a natural economic tendency to deal in large units, or (2) that
dissolution would, really produce the desired results by restoring
competition between the units.9
The instant case concerning price control of gasoline seems likely
to be sustained. Natural conditions in the oil industry may not be
such today as to produce inequality in bargaining between producer
and buyer, though at least two other legislative bodies were moved to
take defensive steps. 10 But the validity of such state action should
be tested by the actual conditions and not by some supposedly suf-
ficient rule about virtual monopoly. It was because the late Circuit
'German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, Kans. Supt. of Ins., 233 U. S. 389,
34 Supt. Ct. 612 (1914). See also State v. Harty, 278 Mo. 685, 213 S. W. 443
(1919) ; People v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 252 Ill. 398, 96 N. E. 1049 (1911)
Freund, Police Power, 388.
'The fallacy of this belief might be either (1) in assuming that competition
will invariably protect the public (see "The Field of Government Price Con-
trol," 35 Yale L. J. 438) or, (2) in assuming that competition is really restored
by enacting or decreeing that it shall be. For example, the Chicago theater
ticket scalpers ordinance is considered by one -writer (13 Va. L. Rev. 554, 563,
footnote 39) to be an effective and proper manner of protecting the public
but it is elsewhere (36 Yale L. J. 985, 986) charged with failure to cure the
evil. The dissolution of the Standard Oil Company (note 7, supra) is popu-
larly supposed to have accomplished well nigh nothing.
"South Dakota in 1925 provided for state marketing of gasoline in com-
petition with private companies in order to secure reasonable prices to its
people. The act was held unconstitutional on a rather narrow ground which
left the present question open. White Eagle Oil & Refin. Co. v. Gunderson,
Governor, 205 N. W. 615 (1925). If the object of state competition is regu-
lation of rates it would seem that the necessity and justification for such gov-
ernmental enterprise would be the same as for regulation directly by price
fixing, although state enterprise frequently has a different object and is there-
fore justifiable on other grounds, as e.g., charity, where the object is to supply
some public need free or below reasonable commercial figures. See 27 Yale
L. J. 824; 21 Mich. L. Rev. 455; Green v. Frazer, 253 U. S. 233, 40 Sup. Ct.
499 (1920). The City of Lincoln gasoline selling ordinance was sustained by
the state court (114 Neb. 243, 207 N. W. 172, 208 N. W. 964) and by the
U. S. Supreme Court in 48 Sup. Ct. 155.
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Judge Baker was unwilling to be bound by an arbitrary test and in-
sisted, as he usually did, on considering existing conditions that he
and his brethren on the federal bench in Indiana sustained a wartime
state regulation of coal prices.1'
M. S. BRECKENRIDGE.
ADMISSIBILITY OF CONFIDENTIAL CONFESSION TO SPIRITUAL
ADVISER
The case of State v. Alma Petty Gatlin, tried before Judge
Cameron McRae at a Special Term of the Superior Court of Rock-
ingham County last February, aroused the interest of the public
generally by its sensationalism; it is of peculiar interest to the pro-
fession-for the first iime in North Carolina the question of the
admissibility of a confidential confession as evidence was squarely
raised. The case itself will not go before the Supreme Court; Mrs.
Gatlin was acquitted. The question, therefore, remains unsettled.
There is one point to be borne in mind in considering these cases;
whether the minister may be compelled to testify is quite a different
question from whether the matter secured from the confidential con-
fession is admissable as evidence.
HISTORY OF THE QUESTION
Is a confidential comunication to a minister, priest or spiritual
adviser admissible as evidence? The question is, at least, as old as
the Roman Law of an early period. In Rome not only were such
communications excepted from evidence, but the priest who revealed
them was punished, even where he had sworn not to reveal the in-
formation. The theory was that the communication passed through
"Am. Coal Mining Co. v. Special Comn., 268 Fed. 563 (D. Ind. 1920), ap-
peal dismissed on company's motion, 258 U. S. 632, 42 S. Ct. 273. See notes
19 Mich. L. Rev. 74, 415; Simpson, "Due Process and Coal Price Regulation,"
9 Iowa L. Bull. 145 (1924); People v. United Mine Workers, 201 Pac. 55
(Colo., 1921). Even by this broad rule there would be no foundation for gen-
eral price regulation such as attempted but overthrown in Montana. Holter
Hdwe. Co. v. Boyle, 263 Fed. 134 (D. Mont., 1920). See Slate v. Goldstein,
93 So. 308 (Ala. App., 1922); Territory v. McCandless, 24Hawaii, 485 (1918).
And it is hard to see what caused the United States Supreme Court in one
case to permit an inference of approving state regulation of laundry rates.
Okla. Operating Co. v. Love, 252 U. S. 331, 40 Sup. Ct. 338 (1920). Rent
regulation was sustained as an emergency measure during the war. Block v.
Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135, 41 Sup. Ct. 158 (1921) ; Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264
U. S. 543, 44 Sup. Ct. 405 (1924); cf. State v. R. R. Coun., 183 N. W. 687
(1921) wherein the Wisconsin Act was held invalid because of being applicable
only to Milwaukee; Rumbo v. Winterroud, 228 S. W. 258 (Tex. Civ. App.,
1921) holding invalid statute which prohibifed farm landlord taking more than
certain percent of produce as rent.
